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Abstract: Unlike other auction-based carbon emission markets, California’s carbon market (AB32) utilizes 
a consignment auction design in which utilities are allocated a share of emissions permits that they must 
sell into the uniform-price auction. Auction revenue is returned to the consignee, which creates an incentive 
to increase the auction clearing price through strategic bidding. In a numerical example, we identify the 
incentive that consignees have to overstate their quantity demanded in the auction, since this increases the 
probability that the auction clears at a higher price. This results in inefficient allocations and inflated auction 
prices. We test this effect through a series of laboratory experiments and confirm these predictions. Findings 
indicate that overall firm profits are lower in a consignment auction than in a non-consignment auction 
market, and that firms are more likely to not receive the quantity of permits they need for program 
compliance in the auction. We conclude with implications for the design and modification of future Coasian 
markets. 
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Throughout the past four decades, research evaluating market-based approaches to environmental policy 
has proliferated. Much of the early work focused on tradeoffs between the various price-based approaches 
and standard regulatory approaches (Dales, 1968; Montgomery, 1972; Tietenberg, 2006). Since then, a 
number of inefficiencies associated with market-based approaches have been discovered. These include 
inefficiencies from political misallocation of emissions permits (Dewees, 2008; Ellerman et al., 2000), 
distortionary influences from regulatory governance (Arimura, 2002; Averch and Johnson, 1962), 
inefficiencies due to imperfect competition and market power (Hahn, 1984; Malik, 2002; Misiolek and 
Elder, 1989; Van Egteren and Weber, 1996), and distortionary interactions with deregulated electricity 
markets (Dormady, 2013; Joskow and Kahn, 2002). 
The importance of an efficient initial allocation of permits has featured prominently in recent 
debates. Early market designs required the regulator to allocate the initial endowment of permits among 
existing firms (i.e., “grandfathering”), which created a complicated and contentious political process 
(Ellerman et al., 2000), resulting in environmental “hot spots” and other social equity concerns (Ringquist, 
1998). More contemporary implementations use auctions to overcome these issues. It is argued that auctions 
are more efficient, reduce tax distortions, provide more flexibility in the distribution of costs, provide 
greater incentives for abatement innovation, are fairer and, thus, reduce politically contentious arguments 
(Burtraw and Sekar, 2014; Cramton and Kerr, 2002). 
Here we caution that auctions can generate inefficiencies when designed poorly. If the regulator is 
willing to keep the revenues collected from the auction, then efficiency is not difficult to achieve: A sealed-
bid auction with Vickrey pricing (or the ascending-clock variant of Ausubel 2004) gives full efficiency in 
equilibrium. A reasonable (though not fully efficient) alternative is to use uniform pricing, since it is 
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transparent and sets a clear signal of the value of permits going forward.1 But if the regulator is constrained 
to collect zero revenues (meaning revenues cannot be used to fund government activities or reduce taxes 
and instead are statutorily required to be returned to electric utilities), how should such an auction be 
modified? A naïve solution is to redistribute the collected revenue back to the bidders, as is done in the 
consignment process. But doing so can distort bidders’ incentives and can generate serious allocation 
inefficiencies in the auction. In general, any firm that will receive consignment revenues from more units 
than they plan to purchase for themselves becomes a ‘net seller’ of permits and therefore has an incentive 
to increase the clearing price in the auction through bid manipulations. Symmetrically, any firm receiving 
sales revenues from fewer units than they plan to purchase for themselves becomes a ‘net buyer’ and has 
an incentive to decrease the clearing price through bid manipulation.  
 Today’s carbon markets in the U.S. utilize auctions for the initial allocation of tradeable permits, 
rather than grandfathering. The European Emissions Trading System (ETS) markets will also be required 
to utilize auctions going forward, and a number of other international carbon markets are considering the 
utilization of auctions. Since 2008, nine East-coast states operate an auction-allocated carbon market known 
as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) (see Dormady, 2013; RGGI, 2010). RGGI, which covers 
only the electricity sector, does not utilize a consignment mechanism in its auction for the initial allocation 
of nearly 100 percent of its carbon permits. Revenues from the auction are used to either backfill state 
deficits or are invested in energy efficiency and renewable energy programs at the discretion of state 
governments. That revenue is not returned to the utilities or wholesale generators that purchase the permits. 
Regulated utilities pass through any permit acquisition costs in their rate base subject to commission 
approval, and independent power producers who participate in regional ISO/RTO markets pass through 
costs indirectly to utilities through wholesale markets (e.g., the day-ahead market). 
                                                     
1 Studies of inefficiencies in emissions trading auctions have mainly been focused on strategic demand reduction under uniform 




Juxtaposed to RGGI, California has been operating the Assembly Bill 32 (AB32) market since 
2012, in which consignment auctions are used to initially allocate permits to the electricity, natural gas and 
oil-refining sectors. California pre-allocates a fixed and significant quantity of permits to the main 
distribution utilities at zero cost. This is similar to grandfathering, except these firms are then required to 
consign, or sell, all allocated permits into the auctions.  All firms in applicable sectors are then required to 
purchase the permits that they need for program compliance in the auction.  The revenue that distribution 
utilities obtain from the sale of consigned permits is returned to them at the marginal price at which the 
auction cleared. It is then required to be used to benefit ratepayers in their respective service territories, 
broadly defined. Revenue from the sale of any additional permits sold by the regulator (i.e., the California 
Air Resources Board) for permits that are under the cap but not allocated to consigning utilities is returned 
to the state’s general fund. This auction format is a modified revenue-neutral auction, similar to the Hahn 
and Noll (1983) auction, with the key difference being that only certain bidders (i.e., distribution utilities) 
are allocated units to consign. The divergence in auction design between the RGGI and AB32 markets has 
raised new questions of efficiency in auction design more generally, and auctions as an allocative 
mechanism for emissions trading markets more specifically. Both markets utilize a uniform-price sealed 
bid auction format, but only the AB32 market uses consignment. 
The efficiency implications of this consignment auction mechanism are presently unclear. Whereas 
in a typical uniform-price carbon auction it is clear that all firms have an incentive to bid strategically to 
acquire their emissions permits at the lowest possible cost.  In a consignment auction it is not as clear cut. 
Those firms that consign a larger share of emissions permits than they demand in the short-run become net 
sellers of emissions permits in the market. Their incentives in the auction can be distorted, so standard 
models of bidding behavior would not directly apply and the importance of a laboratory investigation 
becomes much clearer. Moreover, there are important policy implications at both the state and regional 
levels. Inefficiencies in permit allocation associated with distortions in auction design can potentially result 
in adverse societal, environmental and financial consequences. It is imperative that we understand what 
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auction designs are most efficient for the initial allocation of tradeable permits, and what pitfalls can be 
avoided.  
In this paper we study how consignment affects behavior in uniform price auctions. We consider a 
setting with no consignment (e.g., RGGI) and compare it to three different levels of consignment—one in 
which all firms are consigned permits to sell, one in which only low-emissions firms are consigned permits, 
and one in which only high-emissions firms are consigned permits. We show that, in theory, firms who are 
consigned units have an incentive to distort their bids, leading to inefficiencies. We then observe actual 
behavior in an experimental setting to see whether these distortions and inefficiencies are in fact realized.  
More specifically, our main treatment conditions compare the standard uniform-price auction to the 
uniform-price auction utilizing consignment. Our treatments also include differentiated production 
consisting of both high and low emissions-intensity producers. This allows us to simulate two common 
generalizable regulatory contexts, such as merchant gas and coal wholesale producers. Experimental results 
indicate that the consignment mechanism results in significantly higher auction-clearing prices across the 
board. We also find that the consignment mechanism results in significantly lower efficiency, and that it 
can be financially injurious to the profit of consigning firms.  
 
1.1 Comparison to Existing Empirical Approaches  
This paper highlights leading empirical analyses of revenue-neutral auctions. Prior work by 
Franciosi et al. (1993) and Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994) reported on controlled laboratory 
experiments investigating the revenue-neutral auction design. This work occurred during the design debates 
surrounding the use of auctions for sulfur dioxide permits under the U.S. Acid Rain Program (Title IV) of 
the Clean Air Act.  
Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore compare a revenue-neutral auction to a double auction and find that 
the revenue-neutral auction is less efficient than the double auction, and that it results in lower auction-
clearing prices. They find that when a monopolist is endowed with all available permits—and is therefore 
guaranteed to be a net seller—the revenue-neutral auction continues to be less efficient than the double 
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auction but now generates higher clearing prices. This finding is broadly consistent with our experimental 
results—although we do not explicitly model monopoly. On the other hand, Franciosi et al. compare the 
revenue-neutral auction to a standard uniform-price auction and find that the revenue-neutral auction results 
in higher auction-clearing prices; however, their results do not hold at a high degree of statistical 
significance. And in stark contrast to the results presented here, they find the revenue-neutral auction to be 
more efficient than the standard uniform-price auction.  
One possible reason for the divergent results is that we allow for scenarios in which the emissions 
cap can be binding (i.e., the supply of permits is exceeded by demand). When this occurs, firms have a 
constant marginal value for permits (equal to the non-compliance penalty). Consistent with insights gained 
through the empirical literature on cheating behavior in emissions markets (Malik, 2002; Misiolek and 
Elder, 1989; Van Egteren and Weber, 1996), firms have no direct incentive to pay a higher marginal price 
to acquire a permit in an auction if that price exceeds the marginal price of the non-compliance penalty. 
And, consistent with the AB32 market design, our firms know with certainty whether they will be net buyers 
or net sellers as actual firms operating in these markets do. These differences stem from the fact that we 
take a short-run view in which firms cannot adjust pollution output or abatement (which are inherently 
longer run) in response to permit prices, while these other papers implicitly assume they can. We highlight 
the practical applicability of a more short-run auction experiment—carbon prices are a relatively small 
component of firms’ production costs and very unlikely to modify production behavior (e.g., quantity of 
petroleum refined in Southern California) in the short-run (Newbery, 2016).  
A related seminal paper utilized a laboratory experiment to test auction performance between a 
standard uniform-price auction and the eventual EPA Title IV market design—a double auction with some 
unique design characteristics (Cason and Plott, 1996). While their results find that the uniform-price auction 
is more efficient and generally outperforms the EPA auction design, their paper does not utilize a revenue-
neutral or consignment component and is not directly instructive. It is noteworthy nonetheless that they 
similarly find the uniform-price auction to be superior for trading emissions permits, which further 
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motivates our methodological approach and experimental design—described in the next section—in terms 
of testing against the standard uniform-price auction as a control, or base, case. 
In the sections to follow, we detail our experimental design and four major treatment conditions, 
identify core hypotheses to be tested in the experiment, and present detailed analyses of our results at the 
aggregate (market) and individual (firm) levels. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
The experiment is designed to test the efficiency of the consignment mechanism as utilized in a carbon 
auction, in comparison to a non-consignment auction mechanism. We begin with a description of the 
consignment mechanism. 
 
2.1 The Consignment Mechanism  
In a traditional Coasian market the regulator sets a target annual emissions cap at the socially-
efficient emissions level. That cap usually decreases annually at a fixed rate until the statutory target is 
achieved within a reasonable planning horizon. The regulator issues tradeable property rights (e.g., permits, 
credits, allowances) matching that annual cap, typically such that one emissions permit allows the holder 
to emit 1,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). 
Auctions for the initial allocation of permits all utilize a non-discriminatory auction format: the 
uniform-price sealed bid auction, in which firms place a bid for both a price and a quantity of emissions 
permits.2 Bids are ranked by price from highest bid to lowest bid, and when the quantity of price-ranked 
bids meets the quantity of permits auctioned, permits are awarded to winning bidders at a uniform auction-
clearing price. The revenue generated by the auction of these emissions permits is equivalent to the uniform 
auction-clearing price multiplied by the quantity of permits awarded. Surrendered permits (i.e., permits 
                                                     
2 It is important to note that in operating emissions markets in the U.S. firms do not submit a schedule of bids, and instead submit 
a single price-quantity bid. 
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used for program compliance) are returned, or electronically cancelled, by the regulator. For a detailed 
description of the uniform price auction, see Milgrom (2004), Krishna (2009), and Dormady (2013). 
Under a consignment mechanism, emissions permits are freely allocated to the utilities before the 
auction. The utilities are then required to consign, or sell, all of those allocated permits into the quarterly 
auction. The utilities then keep the revenue from the sale of those permits. Firms purchasing emissions 
permits, including the distribution utilities that are themselves consigning permits, purchase from the pool 
of permits that includes those that they consigned. Additional (non-consigned) permits are included in the 
pool of permits. These additional permits are sold by the state and generate additional revenue. This is 
consistent with the accounting of emissions, as utility emissions are not the only emissions counted in the 
aggregate socially-efficient economy-wide cap. 
 
2.2 Experiment Setup 
The lab experiment simulates a Coasian permit auction under stochastic permit demand and a 
variety of treatment conditions, detailed below. All treatments utilized the uniform-price sealed bid auction. 
In each session, 16 subjects (4 groups of 4) participated for two practice periods and 51 actual periods, 
though they were not informed of the total number of periods. 
At the start of each period, each subject was randomly and independently assigned a production 
level of either 4, 5, or 6 units of energy. This broadly represents quarterly consumption levels for a 
distribution utility or output from a wholesale generator, for example. The levels are representative of low, 
intermediate and peak levels of energy demand in regional energy markets.3 Subjects received fixed revenue 
from their production of energy: for every unit of energy they produced, they receive $100 experimental.4 
As such, in any period, subjects received a fixed ‘endowment’ of production revenue, $400, $500 or $600 
experimental.  
                                                     
3 Peak production may also be broadly representative of months during low-hydro years in California, in which full generation 
output from fossil units is required to clear aggregate system-wide demand and reserve margins. 
4 At the end of the session, all experimental currency was exchanged for US$ at the rate of $1 for every $1,000 experimental. 
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Production also creates pollution, and subjects need to purchase permits to cover the pollution they 
produce. At the start of the session, half of the subjects were randomly assigned to be a ‘High’ type, and the 
other half were assigned to be a ‘Low’ type. This type assignment remained fixed across all periods. In each 
period, the subjects were randomly matched into four groups of four, such that each group contained two 
High types and two Low types. Subjects are not aware of the identities of their competitors at any time; 
they only know that they are in a randomly-drawn group of four consisting of two High types and two Low 
types. Also, because the auctions were sealed bid, subjects could not see the bids of others bidding against 
them. 
The difference between High types and Low types is in the units of pollution emitted per unit of 
energy produced (i.e., emissions factor). High types emit two units of pollution for each unit of energy 
produced. Low types emit only one unit of pollution for each unit of energy produced. Thus, High types 
demand twice as many permits as Low types for a given production level. These two types are broadly 
representative of coal and natural gas generation, respectively, which are the two predominant carbon-
emitting sources of power generation today.5 We refer to ‘High’ and ‘Low’ as the firm’s pollution type, and 
4, 5, or 6 as their production type. We view pollution types as publicly observable, while production types 
are private information. Note that pollution types are fixed throughout, that production types are redrawn 
each period, and that there is no correlation between pollution types and production types.  
In each period, pollution permits are sold via the uniform price auction. Given the range of possible 
pollution types and production types, the aggregate permit demand in any period ranged from 24 to 36 
permits. The aggregate supply of emissions permits sold at auction in any period was always 30 permits. 
Given the fixed supply of emissions permits, this design allows us to test our hypotheses both for cases in 
which the permit demand exceeds, and is exceeded by, permit supply.  
                                                     
5 Coal production is approximately twice (1.6 times depending on technology) as carbon-intensive as natural gas production. For 
simplicity and ease of subject understanding, we simplified this to an emissions factor ratio of 2:1. 
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Subjects could bid for any quantity of emissions permits, irrespective of their individual pollution 
output. Bids were placed in the form of a single price-quantity pair rather than a schedule of bids. A subject 
holding a deficit of emissions permits at the end of the period would incur a non-compliance penalty of $50 
experimental for each unit of pollution output greater than their number of permits on hand. Subjects face 
limited liability: if they lose money in a given period, their final profit for that period is adjusted to zero.6  
 
2.3 Treatments 
The experiment includes four treatments (see Table 1) that generalize common auction-based 
market designs and heterogeneous regional production portfolios. The control treatment provides a market 
with no permit consignment and all auction revenue is returned to the regulator. This is consistent with the 
system used in the RGGI market region (Northeastern US). The remaining treatments include permit 
consignment that depends on firms’ pollution types. Permit consignment consists of a pre-auction allocation 
of a fixed quantity of emissions permits to certain subjects, and entitles the allocated subject to the revenue 
from the sale of those permits at the auction’s clearing price. In the main treatment, all subjects are required 
to consign an allocated quantity of emissions permits. For robustness, we also study treatments in which 
only the High pollution types or only the Low pollution types consign permits. In these treatments, all 
auction revenue from the sale of consigned permits returns to the consignees, and the revenue from the sale 
of non-consigned permits returns to the regulator. 
In the main treatment group in which all subjects consign permits, High pollution types are 
allocated 10 permits and Low pollution types are allocated 5 permits. This is consistent with historical 
emissions-based allocation systems utilized in both California and RGGI. These are also the average permit 
demand for each pollution type. The firms are forced to sell their allocated permits into the auction (keeping 
                                                     
6 The limited liability rule was not exercised much in this experiment, in total only 0.3% (26) of all observations. Its modal 
occurrence was in practice periods in which subjects were familiarizing themselves with the software.  
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the resulting revenue) and must purchase for program compliance any permits that they wish to use to cover 
their pollution output.  
With consignment, firms’ incentives can vary widely depending on their production type. A firm 
with only 4 units of energy production receives more permits than they need, and therefore becomes a net 
seller of permits in the auction. They clearly prefer a higher auction price. A firm with 6 units of production 
does not have enough permits and becomes a net buyer, clearly preferring a lower auction price. A firm 
with 5 units is allocated exactly the number of permits that they need for their pollution output and are net 
neutral. By allowing production types to vary, we can study the impact these differential incentives have 
on bidding behavior. 
Table 1. Experiment Treatment Parameters 
 
 
In the treatment in which only Low pollution types consign permits, each Low type subject is 
allocated 5 permits. In the treatment in which only High pollution types consign permits, each High type 
subject is allocated 10 permits. Again, this creates net buyers and net sellers, depending on the realized 
energy production levels. Any bidder that is not consigning permits can also be thought of as a net buyer, 
which is the case in our control group in which no consignment occurs.  
The High-only and Low-only treatments are broadly representative of markets with merchant gas 
and merchant coal production, respectively. These are also broadly representative of East Coast and West 













































Coast markets, respectively. In a very broad and general sense, East Coast markets tend to consist of utilities 
generating native load mainly from coal power, with IPPs supplying generally from gas. The opposite is 
generally true in West Coast markets, in which utilities tend to generate more from gas (or renewables) than 
coal. Because our explicit focus is the bidding incentives of the auction phase, we do not simulate numerous 
combinations of generation portfolios, and moreover, that would add unnecessary complexity to the 
experiment. 
 
2.4 Recruitment and Sampling 
The experiments were conducted at the [redacted] University Experimental Economics Laboratory. 
Subjects were recruited by an email solicitation through the experimental economics subject pool. Subjects 
consisted of undergraduate students in economics, as well as other majors across campus in the physical 
and natural sciences, and other social science disciplines. Subjects were randomly matched to experimental 
sessions dependent upon their availability, and treatments were assigned randomly to scheduled sessions. 
 
2.5 Experiment Operation  
We conducted eight 2.5-hour experimental sessions, excluding pilot sessions. Of these eight, we 
conducted two sessions for each of our four treatments. Each session consisted of four markets, or 
experiments, operating simultaneously. Each session began with a set of written subject instructions and a 
walk-through of the user interface. Experimental software was programmed using Z-TREE (Fischbacher, 
2007). Subjects received two handouts consisting of the written instructions and a payment form, as well 
as consent forms.  
In total, there were 16 subjects per session, consisting of four groups of four bidders each, and eight 
sessions in total, for a total of 128 subjects. On average, subject earnings were $32, including a ten-dollar 
show-up payment. The standard deviation in earnings was approximately $2.30, with a range between 




3. Auction Predictions & Hypotheses 
3.1 Auction Predictions 
We use computational methods to find a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for our experimental market. We 
were able to identify a pure-strategy equilibrium in our main treatment, the All Consign treatment. We were 
unable to find a pure-strategy equilibrium for the No Consign, Low Consign, and High Consign treatments.7 
This equilibrium highlights the intuitive distortions from the utilization of the consignment mechanisms 
that we describe above. We also confirm that bidding truthfully is not an equilibrium; net sellers have an 
incentive to manipulate the expected clearing price by increasing their quantity bids while net buyers have 
a countervailing incentive to decrease their quantity bids. 
Table 2. Equilibrium Bidding Strategies in the All-Consign Treatment 
Firm Type Permits Consigned Permits Needed Quantity Bid Price Bid 
Low Net Seller 5 4 4 $50 
Low Zero Net 5 5 5 $50 
Low Net Buyer 5 6 6 $50 
High Net Seller 10 8 9 $50 
High Zero Net 10 10 10 $50 
High Net Buyer 10 12 11 $50 
 
The equilibrium bids for each type are shown in Table 2. Specifically, with consignment, all firms 
submit a price bid of $50. As for quantity bids, the low types that have pollution levels of 4, 5, and 6 bid 
truthful quantities of 4, 5, and 6 permits, respectively. The high types that have pollution levels of 8, and 12 
distort their quantities, bidding 9, and 11 respectively. Intuitively, the high-type net sellers overbid on 
quantity by a small amount to try to increase the chance that the good is rationed and sold for a positive 
price. Similarly, the high-type net buyers underbid on quantity to decrease the chance of positive price. 
Low-type net sellers and net buyers have similar pressure, but for a low-type net seller a one-unit increase 
in their quantity bid turns them into a zero net demand agent, which then eliminates the incentive to overbid 
the quantity. Similarly, a low-type net buyer who tries to underbid the quantity turns themselves into a zero 
                                                     
7 The best responses in these games are highly cyclic, with players' price bids cycling while quantity bids remained equal to the 
quantity needed. We conjecture that a complex mixed-strategy equilibrium exists in which players choose a mixture of price bids 
but submit truthful quantity bids. 
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net demand agent, eliminating the underbidding incentive beyond that point. High types, on the other hand, 
can manipulate their bid by one unit without changing whether they are a net buyer or net seller. Thus, we 
expect to see more quantity manipulation by high types, but not low types. 
These quantity manipulations lead to potential inefficiencies in auction allocations. For example, 
if one high type is a net buyer and one is a net seller, then the net buyer will end up with one permit less 
than its requirement (forcing it to pay $50 in non-compliance penalties) while the net seller will end up with 
an extra permit it does not need (which also wasted $50 due to the permit's purchase price in the auction). 
This is a $50 inefficiency ex-post, since the net seller could sell her extra permit to the net buyer at any 
price between $0 and $50 and both would be made better off. 
With types being uniformly distributed, the probability of having a high-type net seller and a high-
type net buyer is 2/9. These are exactly the scenarios when inefficiencies are generated, so we expect to see 
an average inefficiency of $50*2/9 = $11.11 in the market.8 
Although the quantity manipulations are symmetric—the high net seller overbids by one unit while 
the high net buyer underbids by one unit—the effect on the clearing prices is actually asymmetric, leading 
to an overall increase in the expected clearing price. In equilibrium the clearing price is $50 in 50 of 81 
possible type profiles, giving an expected clearing price of $50*50/81 = $30.86. If instead all bidders bid 
truthfully the clearing price would be $50 in only 47 of 81 possible type profiles, dropping the expected 
clearing price by $1.85 down to $29.01. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
We would like to use the computational solutions just described to generate testable hypotheses 
about our experiment, but we are limited by the fact that we were able to find an equilibrium only in the 
main treatment (All Consign). Based on our computational analysis of the other treatments, however, we 
                                                     
8 When the low-types are both net sellers then the high-types are sometimes rationed, distorting slightly the cases where 
inefficiencies arise. But these distortions exactly "offset," and in fact the expected inefficiency per period is exactly $11.11. The 
actual calculation is available upon request. 
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conjecture that quantity bids will be truthful in all cases because our computerized iteration of best response 
calculations never deviated from that strategy; it is the equilibrium prices that cycled indefinitely among 
prices below $50. Thus, we proceed (tentatively) by assuming truthful quantity bids and random price bids 
at or below $50 in all treatments except All Consign. 
Under this assumption, our first testable hypothesis is that consignment should lead to rationing 
more often, meaning the clearing price is more likely to be positive. Second, when the clearing price is 
positive, we expect it to be $50 under consignment but much less without consignment, due to price mixing. 
  H1a: Pr(Price>0)AllConsign > Pr(Price>0)OtherTreatments 
  H1b: Avg. Price AllConsign if (Price > 0) > Avg. Price OtherTreatments if (Price > 0)  
Next, we expect quantity manipulations by high-type net buyers and net sellers.  
H2a: High type net sellers inflate their quantity bids in the All Consign treatment. 
H2b:  High type net buyers deflate their quantity bids in the All Consign treatment. 
Finally, we predict that the manipulated quantity bids in the All Consign treatment will generate 
greater inefficiencies and greater non-compliance penalties in that setting. 
H3a: Inefficiency AllConsign > Inefficiency OtherTreatments 
H3b: E[non-compliance penalty] AllConsign > E[non-compliance penalty] OtherTreatments 
 
4. Results 
We report the results of eight sessions in total, two in each of the treatments. Each session ran for 
approximately 2.5 hours including subject instruction time, and all sessions ran for 51 bidding periods in 
total. Data in early periods are noisier due to subjects’ learning, so we restrict all analyses to the final 25 
periods in which behavior stabilizes more. In our appendix, we provide a replication of all results tables 





4.1 Auction Clearing Prices 
Our first hypothesis is that the All Consign prices will be higher, and will be positive more 
frequently. In Table 3 we show these averages by treatment. As predicted, the average auction prices are 
substantially higher when all firms consign, but they are also high when only the inefficient high types (i.e., 
higher pollution per unit of energy output) consign permits. We find a slight decrease in average prices 
when only the efficient low types consign permits.  
Table 3. Auction Clearing Price Summary Statistics 
  Auction Clearing Price 
  Overall % Periods Avg. Price 
Treatment Average With Price = 0 When Price > 0 
























Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. 
To test whether the differences in clearing prices are significantly different between treatments, we 
regress auction clearing price against dummy variables for each treatment (Table 4). We use a Tobit 
regression because auction prices are censored below zero, we control for aggregate permit demand, and 
cluster errors by session. The omitted (reference) category is the control treatment without consignment. 
We find a significant increase in clearing price when all agents consign, and a marginally significant 
increase when only high types consign. The effect of the Low consignment treatment is insignificant. 
Similar results obtain when limiting to only periods with a positive price, though significance is reduced in 
all cases due to the smaller size of this subsample. A logistic regression (also clustered by session and 
controlling for aggregate demand) reveals that all three treatments have a significantly lower chance of 




Table 4. Auction Clearing Price Regression 





Treatment (All Consign) 22.73** 
(7.63) 
Treatment (High Consign) 12.43* 
(7.06) 
Treatment (Low Consign) 1.73 
(2.15) 






McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.07 
    Robust std. errors clustered by session. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
These treatment differences are also visible in scatter plots of auction clearing prices versus 
aggregate demand (Figure 1). Recall that there is a fixed supply of 30 permits. Firms’ marginal value for 
permits is $50 if they are facing non-compliance penalties and $0 if they have sufficient permits to avoid 
these penalties. Thus, the predicted market clearing price is $0 when less than 30 permits are needed in the 
aggregate, and $50 when 30 or more permits are needed. With no consignment (panel a), auction prices are 
most often zero when demand is less than 30, and well below the predicted market clearing price when 
demand is greater than 30. This is consistent with our assumption of truthful quantity bids and low price 
bids. With consignment by all firms (panel b) or only high-type firms (panel c), auction prices frequently 
exceed $50, both when demand is low and high. In equilibrium firms should only submit price bids of at 
most $50, which we clearly reject here since actual clearing prices are often different than $50. When only 
low pollution types consign (panel d), some increase in low-demand clearing prices are observed, and no 





(a)             (b) 
 
(c)             (d) 
 
Figure 1a-d: Auction Clearing Prices for Each Treatment 
Horizontal line labeled “Market Clearing Price” indicates predicted 
auction clearing price of $50 in the control group as reference. 
 
 
In summary, we broadly confirm our hypothesis that consignment leads to higher clearing prices 
and a greater frequency of positive prices, though these effects appear insignificant when only low types 
(i.e., low emissions factor firms) consign permits, consistent with the predictions described above. 
 
4.2 Price Bids 
In theory, we expect all price bids to be $50 under consignment. Without consignment, we 
conjecture that bidders will play a mixed strategy, submitting bids substantially below $50. Table 5 provides 
the actual averages from the experiment, as well as medians and standard deviations. Although our point 
predictions are not borne out (due in part to several bidders submitting very high bids), we do see higher 
average price bids in the All Consign and High Consign treatments, but not in the Low Consign treatment. 














































































































Low pollution types also submit substantially higher bids than the High pollution types—which we discuss 
in greater detail below. Median values in the All Consign and High Consign treatment paint a much clearer 
picture of our theory, all at or very near expectations.  Finally, net sellers bid higher than net buyers or those 
with zero net demand.  












































































- - - 
Values from top to bottom are mean, median, st. dev. of bid price. 
 To see whether these differences are significant, we regress the bid price on dummy variables for 
treatments (excluding no consignment), production type (net buyer or net seller) for subjects who are 
consigning permits, and pollution type.9 The results are shown in Table 6—we include both a cross sectional 
                                                     
9 The effect of aggregate permit demand is insignificant because it is not observable by subjects when placing bids. Thus, we do 
not include it in these bid regressions.  
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Tobit model and a panel (random effects) model to incorporate dynamics. The regressions confirm that All 
Consign generates substantially higher bid prices, both in magnitude and significance. The effect of High 
Consign is also fairly large but significance is marginal. The Low Consign bid prices are indistinguishable 
from the No Consign treatment. Net sellers clearly submit higher bids, and high pollution types submit 
significantly lower bids. 
Table 6: Bid Price Regression Analysis 



































Log Likelihood  -18,920.36 
Log Psuedo Likelihood -20,632.71  
F-statistic 5.80**  
Wald Chi2  158.02** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.01  
N 3,328 3.328 
Robust std. errors clustered by subject (excludes panel model). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
To further understand the actual incentives faced by the bidders when choosing their price bids, we 
perform a Monte Carlo simulation of a hypothetical subject submitting various price bids when paired with 
three other randomly-selected subjects from our data. For each price level this calculation is done 250 
times—each with a new group of three opponents—and the average profit for each price bid is graphed in 
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Figure 2.10 In the No Consignment treatment, we see that the low type's optimal price bid is $21, though 
any bid of $50 or greater still achieves over 99% of the maximum expected profit. In other words, subjects' 
incentives are quite flat, and any price bid over $20 appears to be a near-optimal response to the behavior 
of others. This is because subjects who submit high bids are very unlikely to affect the auction clearing 
price, so one high bid is just as good as another. A similar outcome arises for both types in the All Consign 
treatment: the apparent over-bidding by subjects is in fact a best response to the actual bids of others.11 
 
(a) No Consign, Low Type 
 
(b) No Consign, High Type 
 
(c) All Consign, Low Type 
 
(d) All Consign, High Type 
 
Figure 2 a-d: Price Bid Monte Carlo Simulation Outputs 
 
                                                     
10 We assume the hypothetical subject's quantity bid equals the median quantity bid for his type and production level. Changing 
this assumption does not appear to change the qualitative features of the resulting graphs. Graphs for the remaining treatments 
appear in the appendix. 
11 This does not mean that high bids could be part of an equilibrium. If all price bids were above $50 then subjects would prefer to 
deviate and submit a price bid of $0. 
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Figure 2 shows that high types in the No Consign treatment have a fairly strong incentive to bid $0. 
Doing so drops the expected clearing price because the lowest bidder often sets the clearing price, but also 
exposes the bidder to possible non-compliance penalties due to rationing. High types need to buy many 
permits (because none are consigned to them), so for them the benefit of reducing the clearing price far 
outweighs the cost of a couple of non-compliance penalties.12 Thus, we see the lowest price bids from high 
type subjects in the two treatments where they are not consigned any permits (No Consign and Low Consign 
only). 
 
4.3 Quantity Bids 
Our prediction is that, in the All Consign treatment, net sellers have pressure to overbid their true 
quantity demand and net buyers have pressure to underbid their true quantity demand. But it is only the 
high types that can act on this pressure, since low types who misrepresent their true demand become zero 
net demanders and the incentive to misrepresent disappears.  
We show the average, median and standard deviation of the amount by which quantity bids exceed 
permit requirements (i.e., pollution output) in Table 7. In the All Consign treatment we see a general 
tendency to overbid quantities, and that high type net buyers overbid less and high type net sellers overbid 
more. Thus, we see evidence that high types respond to the over- and underbidding incentives, as predicted 
by theory. 
Looking at the median data from Table 7 reveals that most quantity bids are truthful, meaning they 
exactly equal the number of permits needed. In the control (No Consign) treatment, 97.2% of quantity bids 
are truthful, so mean overbidding levels are essentially zero for both pollution types. In the All Consign 
treatment 78.4% of quantity bids are truthful, so the pattern of over- and underbidding is driven by a 
                                                     
12 Of course, all high types bidding $0 would not be an equilibrium, for the bidder could raise their price bid to $1 and greatly 
reduce the risk of being assessed non-compliance penalties. 
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minority of subjects. The percentage of quantity overbids in the High Consign and Low Consign treatments 
are similar at 16.3% and 16.7%, respectively.  












































































- - - 
Values from top to bottom are mean, median, st. dev. of overbidding (quantity bid minus permits needed). 
 
We confirm these insights with regression analysis of bid quantities on permits needed, treatments, 
and bidder types. We use cluster-robust standard errors, clustering by subject13 for our cross-sectional 
model, and we similarly include a random effects Tobit panel model to incorporate any dynamic effects. 
The results appear in Table 8. The coefficient on permits needed is slightly greater than one, indicating the 
                                                     
13 For each of our subject-level regressions (i.e., those with the dependent variable of bid price, bid quantity and profit) we also 
performed the same regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. The results were not qualitatively different 
from the models with subject-level clustering. 
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general tendency to overbid in the control treatment. The treatment variables are all significantly positive 
as well, indicating an even higher general tendency to overbid quantities. 
The interactions of pollution types with production types (for example, High Type * Net Buyer) 
further confirm the theoretical prediction: high type net buyers underbid and high type net sellers overbid. 
These are significant when random effects are included. We also see some tendency for low type net buyers 
to underbid, even though in theory they should not be able to gain from this strategy. Overall, however, we 
do find that bidders respond to incentives to manipulate the clearing price via manipulations in their quantity 
bids. 
Table 8: Bid Quantity Regression Analysis 







Permits Needed 1.09*** 1.06*** 
 (0.06) (0.36) 
Treatment (All Consign) 0.86*** 0.64 
 (0.33) (0.42) 
Treatment (High Consign) 1.14** 1.09*** 
 (0.58) (0.42) 
Treatment (Low Consign) 0.65*** 0.46 
 (0.18) (0.42) 
High Type -1.15 -0.70 
 (0.71) (0.49) 
Low Type -0.29 -0.17 
 (0.22) (0.39) 
High Type * Net Buyer -0.62* -0.43** 
 (0.37) (0.17) 
High Type * Next Seller 0.31 0.40** 
 (0.32) (0.18) 
Low Type * Net Buyer -0.90** -0.34** 
 (0.36) (0.17) 
Low Type * Net Seller -0.38 0.10 
 (0.27) (0.17) 
Log Likelihood  -7,041.01 
Log Psuedo Likelihood -7,758.48  
F-statistic 5,563.80***  
Wald Chi2  4,620.31*** 
N 3,328 3,328 




4.4 Permit Allocation Inefficiency 
Quantity manipulation should lead to permit allocation inefficiencies. Bidders who inflate their bid 
quantity end up receiving more emissions permits than they need in the short run, while bidders that deflate 
their quantity end up paying non-compliance penalties. We define an “inefficiency” as occurring if one 
emissions permit was sold to a bidder in excess of her permit demand and, at the same time, another bidder 
received a non-compliance penalty for being short by a single permit. We then count the number of such 
inefficiencies observed in each period. Mathematically, the resulting measure is min{unused permits, 
penalties paid}. For example, if one firm has two extra permits while two firms each are paying one non-
compliance penalty, we count that as two inefficiencies. On the other hand, if a bidder received a non-
compliance penalty for being short a single permit, and all other bidders did not acquire permits in excess 
of their permit demand, then we identify that auction as having no inefficiencies. 
Without consignment, inefficiencies are very rare, averaging 0.02 per period. In other words, we 
see roughly one inefficiency for every 50 periods of play. In no period were more than two inefficiencies 
observed, and this happened in only one period. The low rate of inefficiency follows because 97% of 
quantity bids are truthful, as we assumed they would be.  
With consignment, however, inefficiencies are much more common. The average number per 
period in the All Consign, High Consign, and Low Consign treatments are 0.95, 0.53, and 0.65, respectively. 
Since each inefficiency represents a social loss of $50, these correspond to per-period welfare losses of 
$47.50, $26.50, and $32.50, respectively, compared to only $1.00 without consignment. Using a dummy 
variable regression with cluster-robust standard errors (clustering by session) as a robustness check (table 
excluded for simplicity), we find that each of these is significantly greater than the No Consign treatment, 
with p-values of 0.043, 0.001, and 0.002, respectively. Comparing among the three consignment treatments 
yields no significant differences, with Wald test p-values all greater than 0.31. 
The increase in inefficiencies is not only due to them being more common; we also see greater 
numbers of inefficiencies when they occur. If we look only at periods with at least one inefficiency, the 
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mean number of inefficiencies per period is 1.33 in the No Consign treatment, but jumps to 3.40, 2.68, and 
2.65 in the All Consign, High Consign, and Low Consign treatments, respectively. 
In our experiment, non-compliance penalties (NCPs) can come from two sources: inefficient 
outcomes, and markets where permit demand is greater than supply. The latter occurs randomly and is 
unaffected by subjects’ decisions. Even if every period’s outcome was efficient, each person would still pay 
an average of $12.96 per period in NCPs. Thus, we calculate the actual average per period and subtract 
$12.96 to give a measure of NCPs paid due to inefficiencies.  
As expected, the results are perfectly in line with the inefficiency measure above. Without 
consignment subjects pay an average of $0.32 per period in excessive NCPs. In the All Consign, High 
Consign, and Low Consign treatments, this increases to $14.50, $8.61, and $7.47, respectively. These are 
all significantly different than our control group that does not utilize consignment.  
Table 9. Average Non-Compliance Penalties in Periods with Inefficiencies 
 Not Consigning Consigning 
Treatment Net Buyer NCPs Net Buyer NCPs 
Zero Net 
Demand NCPs Net Seller NCPs 
Treatment  
(All Consign) 
- $82.92 $50.00 $33.59 
Treatment  
(High Consign) 
$45.12 $76.92 $51.47 $15.91 
Treatment  
(Low Consign) 
$73.04 $33.33 $30.00 $3.03 
 
Above, we made a specific prediction about how inefficiencies should arise: Net sellers buy too 
many units while net buyers buy too few. Thus, if we only look at periods with inefficiencies, we should 
see net buyers paying all the NCPs. The actual results (Table 9) are not quite that stark, but clearly show 
that net buyers in fact pay substantially more NCPs. To test significance, we regress NCPs on treatment, 
production type and pollution type, clustering by individual (again, table omitted for simplicity). We find 
that all treatments are positive and statistically different from the No Consign treatment with the All Consign 
treatment resulting in the highest NCPs (all p-values less than 0.01). We find that high emissions bidders 
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pay significantly higher NCPs (p-value <0.001) and net sellers pay substantially lower NCPs than net 
buyers (p-values <0.01).  
 
4.5 Profit 
We also find that the inefficiency from the quantity bid distortions under consignment is injurious 
to subject-level profit. In Figure 3 we provide the mean subject-level profit by treatment group. We define 
profit as the net of energy production revenue, non-compliance penalty and permit expenditures. We include 
bars for measures of profit that exclude consignment revenue so that it can be compared easily to the control 
group, and we also include bars for profit that includes consignment revenue adjacent to those.  
 
Figure 3. Average Subject Profit by Treatment 
 
In the control group, the mean profit is approximately $436. It is $293 in the All Consign treatment, 
excluding consignment revenue. In Table 10 we report mean profit by treatment group and by permit 
demand. And, we provide these same values including consignment revenue in Table 11. The results in 


















Control All Consign High Consign Low Consign
Profit (excluding consignment revenue) Profit (including consignment revenue)
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bidders with zero net demand, and also lower than all bidders in the control treatment without 
consignment.14  
Table 10. Average Profits (Excluding Consignment Revenue) 
 Not Consigning Consigning 
Treatment Net Buyer Net Buyer 
Zero Net 
Demand Net Seller 
Control  
(No Consign) 
$436.08 - - - 
Treatment  
(All Consign) 
- $305.05 $297.03 $274.79 
Treatment  
(High Consign) 
$405.32 $357.49 $320.78 $313.90 
Treatment  
(Low Consign) 
$404.32 $543.40 $463.27 $376.37 
 
Table 11. Average Profits (Including Consignment Revenue) 
 Not Consigning Consigning 
Treatment Net Buyer Net Buyer 
Zero Net 
Demand Net Seller 
Control  
(No Consign) 
$436.08 - - - 
Treatment  
(All Consign) 
- $534.19 $479.58 $404.00 
Treatment  
(High Consign) 
$405.32 $540.23 $490.66 $414.12 
Treatment  
(Low Consign) 
$404.32 $579.78 $489.87 $400.17 
 
It should be noted, however, that net sellers should ultimately receive a lower profit than net buyers 
by virtue of their lower production in the product market, all else being equal. That is, net buyers are 
producing more in the product market and receiving a larger quantity of production revenue. As detailed 
above, this was operationalized in this experiment as a production of either 4, 5 or 6 units in the product 
market, with corresponding production revenues of $400, $500 and $600 experimental, respectively. 
                                                     
14 The mean revenue from permit sales in the No Consign treatment—revenue that would be received by the government or 
regulator—was $202.08.   
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Because permit allocations are fixed, all bidders with production of 4 units are net sellers, and all bidders 
with production of 6 units are net buyers. We would expect profit, therefore, to be approximately $200 
larger for net buyers than net sellers. This is clearly mitigated by inefficiencies due to the distortion of 
consignment that results in higher permit prices, overspending on permits by net sellers, and more frequent 
non-compliance penalties by net buyers.  
Table 12. Regression of Profit 



































Log Likelihood  -20,2221.60 
Log Psuedo Likelihood -21,400.93  
F-statistic 67.04***  
Wald Chi2  291.97*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.02  
N 3,328 3,328 
Robust std. errors clustered by subject (excludes panel model). * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
We provide additional insight into these results with regression analysis of subject-level profit, 
provided in Table 12. We utilize Tobit models and regress profit (excluding consignment revenue for 
comparison) on our treatment dummies, production type and pollution type. The cross-sectional model 
regression utilizes cluster robust standard errors, clustered by subject. The results provide robust evidence 
that subjects received significantly lower profits in treatments with consignment than in the No Consign 
control group (reference variable). Each treatment dummy is significant at the p<0.01 level, except the 
treatment in which only the low type subjects consign in the cross-sectional model. The results also provide 
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robust evidence that net sellers receive significantly lower profit, and net buyers receive significantly larger 
profit, than zero net demand bidders. Furthermore, the results indicate that high pollution types incur 
significantly less profit than low types.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has provided an experimental analysis of the use of the consignment mechanism in Coasian 
auctions. The results showed that the consignment mechanism results in significantly higher auction-
clearing prices and permit misallocation compared with the standard uniform-price auction without 
consignment. In auction-based cap-and-trade programs (which is all greenhouse gas markets in the U.S., 
and will be all greenhouse gas markets in the E.U.) because the auction is crucial to influencing the market 
price as a benchmark and price signal, inefficiency or misallocation can potentially result in systemic 
efficiency loss, misallocation, misinformed abatement behavior and/or misinformed regulatory decisions. 
The debate surrounding the efficient design of carbon auctions has immediate importance in both the U.S. 
and internationally. In light of the European Union’s directive for all member states to move toward auction-
based allocation, and in light of the gradual adoption of regional carbon markets in the U.S., understanding 
pitfalls of auction design can inform future policy adoption and implementation. 
Our findings have significant implications for electric distribution utilities that receive a pre-auction 
endowment of permits to consign. The argument among utilities, and the California regulator (CARB) is 
that revenue from the sale of consigned emissions permits will offset cost increases that pass through in the 
wholesale price of power. However, our findings provide evidence that the overbidding incentive inherent 
to the consignment auction might actually reduce firm profits. In other words, we find that while utilities 
are making the argument that consignment will be more profitable, to the benefit of ratepayers, the bidding 
incentives of the consignment mechanism may be deleterious to profit because it is likely to inflate the cost 
of compliance.  
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These results also have important policy implications for the regulator. While it is the regulator’s 
aim to effectively balance the social cost of pollution with any economic impacts to households and 
businesses (who bear the ultimate expense of cleanup), our findings would suggest that the regulator may 
not be able to balance the two with a simple revenue adjustment like a consignment mechanism. Though, 
the finding that balancing these major considerations is not as simple as an auction mechanism should not 
be surprising to readers. 
The problem of inefficient auction price may be more expansive in scope than misallocation alone. 
In auction-allocated carbon markets, the auction price plays a critical and systemic role in providing a price 
signal to producers and regulators, particularly long-term decision-makers and those setting cost pass-thru. 
Given that energy firms, in particular, have a planning horizon that exceeds a decade in many cases, the 
current carbon auction price can send a long-term production and abatement signal with long-lasting 
macroeconomic implications. This has been long understood in the broader environmental economics 
literature, as firms make long-term abatement spending and capital decisions on the basis of their discounted 
expected future permit price (Stevens and Rose, 2002). Auction prices distorted by consignment bidding 
can thus have longer term consequences. 
 There are two factors that we do not model in our analysis that may serve to mitigate some of this. 
The first is that we do not model banking. Banking is the ability of firms to store unused emissions permits 
for future use, a program design that is allowed in a majority of the world’s carbon markets and serves to 
enhance temporal flexibility. Our finding that the inefficiency of the consignment auction is driven by the 
overbidding incentive of net sellers, which is also consistent with Ledyard and Szakaly-Moore (1994), may 
be less of a public policy problem in the long run in light of banking. That is, firms may be bidding for an 
additional quantity of emissions permits to increase the auction-clearing price, but firms can simply store 
those excess permits for future use. On the other hand, banking can also facilitate hoarding of permits, 
which is supported by Dormady’s (2014) experimental results. To the degree that banking mitigates some 
of this inefficiency, it would be in the longer term, not necessarily providing any net relief for firms and 
consumers in the here and now. 
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The second mitigating factor is ex-post trading—the ‘trade’ in cap-and-trade. While our analysis 
does not incorporate post auction transfers, strategic overbidding can be balanced in post auction 
transactions bilaterally among firms. Though Dormady and Englander (2016) identify substantial 
transaction costs in this process. From a public policy standpoint, it would be more favorable to avoid using 
secondary market trading to correct auction misallocation, particularly when trading is not costless. It is 
important to note that relying solely upon secondary market trading as a corrective is a second-best policy 
option. 
Moreover, simply because secondary market trading exists and can mitigate some of the adverse 
consequences of poorly constructed auction designs—or auctions designed with alternative policy 
considerations in mind—that is no excuse to wash one’s hands of inefficiencies in the auction itself. 
Corrections for inefficient auction allocations are neither costless to firms nor society. They impose 
transaction costs—through brokerage fees, consultancy services and insurances—and they subject firms to 
short-run permit uncertainty. And more importantly, because the auction phase is the most important price 
signal for the trading market, inflated auction prices arising from strategic overbidding can substantially 
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Appendix. (Intended for Online Supplement) 
 
 
Table A1. Auction Clearing Price Summary Statistics (all periods) 
  Auction Clearing Price 
  Overall % Periods Avg. Price 
Treatment Average With Price = 0 When Price > 0 





























Table A2. Auction Clearing Price Regression (all periods) 





Treatment (All Consign) 
17.95** 
(6.51) 
Treatment (High Consign) 
13.91* 
(8.40) 
Treatment (Low Consign) 
1.98 
(2.21) 








McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.05 
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Table A4: Bid Price Regression Analysis (all periods) 



































Log Likelihood  -37,460.37 
Log Psuedo Likelihood -40,417.65  
F-statistic 5.63***  
Wald Chi2  177.98*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.01  
N 6,528 6,528 
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Table A6: Bid Quantity Regression Analysis (all periods) 







Permits Needed 1.03*** 1.02*** 
 (0.26) (0.30) 
Treatment (All Consign) 1.07*** 0.81* 
 (0.33) (0.42) 
Treatment (High Consign) 1.20** 1.14*** 
 (0.58) (0.42) 
Treatment (Low Consign) 0.60*** 0.39 
 (0.21) (0.42) 
High Type -0.31 -0.14 
 (0.37) (0.45) 
Low Type 0.14 0.11 
 (0.13) (0.37) 
High Type * Net Buyer -0.74** -0.52*** 
 (0.31) (0.14) 
High Type * Next Seller -0.13 0.01 
 (0.30) (0.15) 
Low Type * Net Buyer -0.72** -0.11 
 (0.31) (0.14) 
Low Type * Net Seller -0.34 0.24* 
 (0.30) (0.14) 
Log Likelihood  -14,633.74 
Log Psuedo Likelihood -15,849.07  
F-statistic 2,904.53***  
Wald Chi2  5,280.83*** 
N 6,528 6,528 






Table A7. Average Non-Compliance Penalties in Periods with Inefficiencies (all periods) 
 Not Consigning Consigning 
Treatment Net Buyer NCPs Net Buyer NCPs 
Zero Net 
Demand NCPs Net Seller NCPs 
Treatment  
(All Consign) 
- $96.68 $58.77 $48.46 
Treatment  
(High Consign) 
$47.62 $100.00 $83.65 $71.87 
Treatment  
(Low Consign) 






Table A8. Average Profits (Excluding Consignment Revenue) (all periods) 
 Not Consigning Consigning 
Treatment Net Buyer Net Buyer 
Zero Net 
Demand Net Seller 
Control  
(No Consign) 
$426.62 - - - 
Treatment  
(All Consign) 
- $335.43 $318.57 $270.23 
Treatment  
(High Consign) 
$382.18 $324.69 $389.01 $280.22 
Treatment  
(Low Consign) 






Table A9. Average Profits (Including Consignment Revenue) (all periods) 
 Not Consigning Consigning 
Treatment Net Buyer Net Buyer 
Zero Net 
Demand Net Seller 
Control  
(No Consign) 
$426.62 - - - 
Treatment  
(All Consign) 
- $530.06 $473.45 $393.47 
Treatment  
(High Consign) 
$382.18 $531.64 $479.37 $401.03 
Treatment  
(Low Consign) 







Table A10. Regression of Profit (all periods) 



































Log Likelihood  -39,595.99 
Log Psuedo Likelihood -42,563.93  
F-statistic 159.35***  
Wald Chi2  449.21*** 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.01  
N 6,528 6,528 








(a) High Consign, Low Type 
 
(b) High Consign, High Type 
 
(c) Low Consign, Low Type  
 
(d) Low Consign, High Type 
Figure A1 a-d: Price Bid Monte Carlo Simulation Outputs 
